A woman uses her mobile phone near a damaged picture of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad as people celebrate, after Syrian rebels announced that they have ousted President Bashar al-Assad, in Qamishli, Syria December 8, 2024. (Photo: REUTERS/Orhan Qereman)
In medicine, there’s a disturbing condition called Munchausen syndrome by proxy (now known as Factitious Disorder Imposed on Another), where a caregiver fabricates or induces illness in their dependents, often to maintain control and validate their role as ‘protector.’
As Iran’s regional strategy unravels in 2024, a striking parallel emerges: Tehran’s relationship with its proxy forces bears an uncanny resemblance to this pathological dynamic.
Like the diagnosed caregiver who creates crises to assert control, Iran has positioned itself as the indispensable protector of various regional forces – from Hezbollah in Lebanon to Assad’s regime in Syria.
The “Ring of Fire” strategy, masterfully crafted by the late Iranian General Qasem Soleimani before his elimination in a U.S. drone strike in January 2020, wasn’t just about the military encirclement of Israel. It was a complex web of manufactured dependencies, where Iran’s ‘protection’ often intensified the very conflicts its proxies faced, creating a cycle of perpetual reliance.
But just as Munchausen by proxy ultimately risks destroying both caregiver and dependent, Iran’s strategy has collapsed dramatically, taking its proxies down with it. The recent fall of the Assad regime , accompanied by the humiliating retreat of Shiite loyalists to Iraq, marks the terminal phase of this pathological relationship.
One can only wonder: Did Iran’s compulsive need to be the region’s ‘protector’ ultimately prove self-destructive?
Iran’s military assets and alliances weaken
One significant blow came through unprecedented Israeli military action inside Iran itself. Precision airstrikes targeted missile production facilities across multiple provinces, severely degraded Iranian air defense capabilities, and destroyed drone manufacturing sites. These strikes demonstrated Israel’s ability to penetrate Iranian airspace at will, shattering the notion of Iran’s territorial invulnerability and emboldening Iran’s regional adversaries.
The degradation of Hezbollah’s military capabilities proved to be the crucial turning point. With its most powerful proxy force severely weakened, Iran lost its primary deterrent against both Israeli actions and regional opposition movements. This new reality encouraged Syrian rebel groups and other anti-Iranian forces to act more boldly, fundamentally altering the regional power dynamics.
The collapse of Iran’s position in Syria exposed another underlying weakness in Iran’s strategic edifice: the religious fault lines within its alliance system.
Assad’s Alawite sect, though historically aligned with Shiite Islam, occupies a complex theological position that has always created tensions with Iran’s orthodox Twelver Shiism. These religious distinctions long overlooked in times of strength, became increasingly relevant as Iran faced difficult choices about committing resources to protect its allies.
The Alawite faith, considered heterodox by many Islamic scholars, has always been a point of tension in the Iran-Syria alliance. Sunni Muslims, who form the majority in Syria, view Alawites with particular hostility, considering them even further from orthodox Islam than mainstream Shiites. Iran’s strategic calculations appear to prioritize protecting core Shiite interests over maintaining support for peripheral allies.
The scale of Assad’s fall revealed the extent of Iran’s strategic weakness. When rebel forces launched their offensive, Iran’s inability to provide meaningful support to its longtime ally became starkly apparent. Unlike in 2011-2015, when Iran mobilized significant resources to protect Assad, this time Tehran could only watch as Syria’s army collapsed.
The rapid surrender of major cities like Aleppo, Hama, and Homs – happening over just ten days –demonstrated how thoroughly Iran’s regional influence had eroded. The lack of support from both Iran and Russia, traditionally Assad’s strongest backers, proved decisive in the regime’s swift collapse.
The unraveling continues
The degradation of Hezbollah’s military capabilities following its confrontation with Israel marked a decisive turning point. Eliminating key leadership figures, including several top commanders and operational planners, has created a severe leadership vacuum. The destruction of significant military infrastructure, including command centers, weapons storage facilities, and tunnel networks, has crippled what was once considered Iran’s most potent proxy force. Intelligence estimates suggest that Hezbollah has lost nearly 40% of its elite fighting force and most of its precision missile capabilities.
This unprecedented weakening of Hezbollah has fundamentally altered its relationship with Iran. The traditional coordination mechanisms between Tehran and its Lebanese proxy have been severely disrupted. With Syrian territory no longer secure, Iran has lost its primary route for supplying weapons and military advisers to Hezbollah. The sophisticated command and control systems that once allowed seamless cooperation between Iranian officers and Hezbollah units have been largely dismantled.
Hezbollah’s position within Lebanon itself has also been dramatically altered. The organization faces growing domestic criticism for drawing Israeli retaliation against Lebanon, while its ability to maintain its traditional “state within a state” status has been compromised by military and financial losses. The Lebanese Armed Forces’ deployment to the south, coupled with international peacekeeping presence, has further eroded Hezbollah’s exclusive control over its traditional strongholds.
This stands in stark contrast to earlier phases of the Syrian conflict (2011-2015), when Iran orchestrated a massive mobilization of Shiite forces to prevent Assad’s fall. During that period, Hezbollah committed thousands of fighters to critical battles, Iraqi Shiite militias were redirected from their home territory to fight in Syria, and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) officers provided strategic guidance and coordination in a demonstration of the axis’s former strength.
Assad’s final collapse – What it means for Iran
The collapse of Assad’s regime was remarkably swift. Beginning on November 27, 2024, a coalition of opposition forces launched a surprise offensive that captured around 250 cities, towns, and villages within days. Major cities fell in rapid succession – Aleppo within 24 hours, followed by Hama and Homs, effectively isolating Damascus. The Syrian army’s front lines disintegrated, with troops either surrendering or abandoning their posts. By December 8, rebels had entered Damascus, facing minimal resistance, while Assad reportedly fled to an undisclosed location. The Syrian Prime Minister, Mohammed Ghazi Jalali, announced the government’s readiness to transfer power to a transitional authority, marking the end of the Assad family’s 50-year rule.
The recent fall of the Assad regime represents the culmination of Iran’s strategic setbacks. Unlike previous interventions, this time Tehran appears to have calculated that the cost of intervention would be too high. The situation has deteriorated to the point where Iran now faces the humiliation of having to negotiate with Syrian rebel groups – forces it once dismissed as terrorists – to secure safe passage for its diplomatic personnel from Damascus.
The rebels’ capture of significant military assets from Assad’s forces has further shifted the balance of power. These include advanced air defense systems like the Pantsir S-1 and S-200, chemical weapons stockpiles, and substantial conventional military hardware. This massive transfer of military capabilities represents not just a loss for Assad’s forces but a strategic catastrophe for Iran’s regional posture.
What about Israel?
Israel views these developments with measured optimism while maintaining strategic vigilance. The weakening of Iran’s position represents a clear victory, though the emergence of radical Sunni groups in Syria presents new challenges. The rebel groups’ moderate messaging toward the West provides temporary reassurance, but uncertainty remains about long-term stability along Israel’s northern border.
The nuclear dimension adds another layer of complexity to Israel’s strategic calculations. Iran’s vulnerability might lead it to accelerate its nuclear program as a defensive measure. Conversely, Tehran might calculate that pursuing nuclear capabilities while exposed to both Israeli strikes and Sunni opposition would be too risky, potentially leading to temporary restraint in its nuclear ambitions. This creates a delicate window of opportunity – and risk – for Israel’s strategic planners.
The rebel groups’ control of advanced military capabilities, including air defense systems and chemical weapons stockpiles, presents both opportunities and challenges for Israeli strategic planning. While the degradation of Iran’s proxy network reduces immediate threats, the potential for these weapons to fall into extremist hands requires careful monitoring.
Israel’s strategists must also consider whether the current weakening of Iranian power serves long-term Israeli interests. For years, the Sunni-Shiite conflict has effectively divided Israel’s adversaries, with each Islamic sect focusing more on their sectarian rivalry than on confrontation with Israel. The potential elimination of Iran as a regional power could paradoxically increase Israel’s challenges by allowing Sunni jihadist groups to redirect their focus entirely toward the Jewish state.
This scenario becomes particularly concerning given the vast territories potentially falling under the control of Sunni extremist groups. Without the counterbalance of Iranian-backed forces, these groups might establish new bases of operation closer to Israel’s borders. The historical pattern suggests that while Shiite forces operated under Iran’s strategic restraint, Sunni jihadist groups often demonstrate less predictable and more aggressive behavior patterns.
Theological crisis and future implications
Perhaps most profoundly, these developments have triggered an unprecedented theological crisis within Iran’s clerical establishment. The Ayatollah regime has long positioned itself as the vanguard of Islamic opposition to Israel and the West, viewing this stance as a catalyst for the arrival of the Mahdi, the Shiite redeemer figure. The regime’s expectation of Israel’s imminent defeat, which seemed plausible during the early stages of the October conflict, has been shattered by subsequent events.
This crisis of faith extends beyond military and political setbacks to challenge the very foundation of the regime’s legitimacy. The failure of Iran’s proxy strategy, increasing domestic dissent against the regime’s anti-Israel policies, and growing international isolation have created a profound ideological challenge. The unfulfilled prophecies regarding Israel’s defeat have led to questioning of the regime’s religious narrative among its core supporters.
Then there’s the rest of the Iranian public – some of which are not Shiite at all. The Iranian public’s increasing rejection of the regime’s anti-Israel stance challenges its legitimacy at home. This ideological dissonance between apocalyptic rhetoric and geopolitical realities forces a fundamental reassessment of Iran’s revolutionary identity and its role in the Islamic world.
The transformation of Soleimani’s “Ring of Fire” into a circle of vulnerability represents more than a strategic defeat – it signals a potential unraveling of the theological foundations upon which Iran’s revolutionary regime has built its legitimacy. Much like patients who eventually break free from the destructive cycle of Munchausen by proxy, Iran’s proxies and the public are beginning to recognize the pathological nature of the regime’s ‘protective’ relationship. The collapse of this strategy reveals a profound truth: a protector who requires a perpetual crisis to maintain its role ultimately destroys not only its dependents but also itself.
