Are Mercenaries a Way to Split the Difference on Regime Change? 

The world is filled with brutal dictatorships that oppress their people. These regimes also often impoverish their populations, both materially and spiritually. Even when rulers of such systems promote prosperity, governing elites skim sometimes enormous sums for their own enrichment.

Venezuela dwells in the international human rights cellar. Reports Freedom House: 

Venezuela’s democratic institutions have been deteriorating since 1999, but conditions have grown sharply worse in recent years due to harsher government crackdowns on the opposition and the ruling party’s use of thoroughly flawed elections to seize full control of state institutions. The authorities have closed off virtually all channels for political dissent, restricting civil liberties and prosecuting perceived opponents without regard for due process.

President Nicolas Maduro is attempting to baptize his brutal reign with another stolen election. His shameful theft has sparked talk of creating a private army to restore popular rule. The idea is tempting; yet who can forget Operation Gideon, the madcap misadventure four years ago in which roughly three score Venezuelan expatriates along with two American mercenaries arrived to oust the regime that had controlled the Venezuelan state for more than a quarter century. Far from taking Maduro & Co. by surprise, Silvercorp USA, which planned the invasion, tweeted that its vast horde was on the way. Unsurprisingly, the operation did not end well.

No doubt, more serious people could organize a more serious effort. Yet even those often run aground. Consider the CIA’s infamous Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. Some 1400 Cuban exiles backed by eight World War II bombers landed on Cuba’s southern coast, planning to establish a provisional government and await an outpouring of popular support. Just about everything that could go wrong did so, despite American backing.

Of course, experienced mercenaries were once common, busy in Europe into the 19th century. Such were the roughly 30,000 Hessians who fought for Great Britain against the colonists, though they were members of units leased from their governments rather than soldiers hired individually. Moreover, Article 2, Section 8 of the new U.S. Constitution authorized Congress to “grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal,” which essentially meant recruiting private naval vessels to fight for America. 

Mercenaries continue to exist and often have bested larger, ill-trained forces deployed by regimes and insurgents alike. In the 1990s the euphemistically named mercenary firm Executive Outcomes famously defeated Angola’s UNITA, forcing it to the negotiating table, and defended Sierra Leone’s government from guerrillas. Nevertheless, effectively conquering a larger, more complex nation—that is, winning both militarily and politically—is another task entirely. Especially for U.S. firms. Blackwater, later renamed Xe and then Academi, became America’s most famous (or infamous) private military company, but it mostly operated as a defense contractor for the U.S. government. 

Putting history behind us, is fielding a mercenary army a viable option for effecting regime change? There are many candidates for forced removal: one could start with North Korea, Russia, and China. Iran, Eritrea, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia belong on any “sayonara dictator” list. To these countries add Bahrain, Afghanistan, United Arab Emirates, Nicaragua, Cuba, and most of the Central Asian states. Also Zimbabwe and Burma. The list goes on.

Yet in few of these cases does the private option seem feasible. Most of these regimes are too big, strong, and entrenched, with at least some, and sometimes serious, support. Maybe Nicaragua or Zimbabwe is weak enough. Perhaps Burma could be pushed to the edge by outside fighters. And, of course, there is Venezuela.

Could Venezuelan expatriates raise millions of dollars to create an army and air force? Five years ago, the Blackwater founder Erik Prince reportedly proposed establishing a 5,000-man force of Venezuelan exiles. In July, Prince posted on X, “If @KamalaHarris and @JoeBiden want to actually support Freedom and legitimate elections in Venezuela they should elevate the bounties to $100m each on these already wanted criminals @NicolasMaduro and @dcabellor and all the others in their cartel. Then sit back and watch the magic happen. You can even pay these out from frozen regime money already in US banks.” 

Maybe such an offer would spark an internal revolt or encourage an outside invasion. Or perhaps multiple, competing efforts. But would it be a solution to Venezuela’s travails?

All to the good: A mercenary force could be raised without Washington’s involvement, military, political, or financial. Many people around the world treat the U.S. armed forces as their personal bodyguards, suppliers, armorers, and contractors when they push it to support and/or overthrow regimes good and bad. But Washington’s primary responsibility is to protect Americans, not risk their lives and squander their wealth in other people’s wars. Especially as the dangers of conflict increasingly reach the American homeland, through both missiles and terrorism. War should be a last resort, not a tool for wanton social engineering and constant regime change.

The costs of military intervention are high. Over the last quarter century, promiscuous war-making has killed thousands of Americans and hundreds of thousands of foreign civilians. Most of America’s conflicts have turned out much worse than predicted. The assumption that Uncle Sam could fix other nations and then make a glorious exit proved fanciful. Washington gained a global reputation for murderous hypocrisy, most recently in Iraq and Gaza. Uncle Sam’s policies also made individual Americans terrorist targets as angry people around the world took their revenge.

Of course, Washington’s history of intervention leaves the world suspicious even when the U.S. government is not involved in a military campaign, such as (presumably) Operation Gideon. Indeed, the Maduro government recently arrested a motley six-man crew, conveniently if unconvincingly accusing them of being part of a CIA-led plot to assassinate Maduro and other officials. Any connection between America and a new force would be exploited. Paradoxically, reversing course and consistently refusing to intervene would help clear the way for private action in the future. Of course, Washington would have to allow private ventures to fail, even if their success (for example, ousting Maduro) would advance official U.S. policy.

The challenge to Washington would be even greater if private interests organized against U.S. policy. Imagine Saudi emigres planning to overthrow the odious Mohammed bin Salman, who murders and dismembers his critics. Although the Biden administration once raged against his manifold human rights violations—the group Freedom House rates the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia below Iran, Russia, and China—the president recently advanced a proposal to turn the US military into a modern Janissary corps and act as the Saudi royal family’s bodyguard. Washington then might feel forced to oppose private efforts. A smart mercenary organization could attempt to ascertain the U.S. government’s attitude before beginning, but that would prove difficult: Washington policymaking is hardly a rational, predictable business even in the best of times.

The logistical problems of raising a private army also would be enormous. It is one thing to train 60 Venezuelan expats. But 5,000? Or even more? Where would the force operate? How would it maintain operational security? And who would serve? Although some Venezuelan military deserters expected to subsequently campaign against the Maduro regime, most exiles are probably readier to criticize the Maduro regime than to fight it. What if the only way to fill the ranks was to recruit Ukrainians, Russians, Nigerians, Syrians, Libyans, Sudanese, and others with recent military experience? Knitting together such a force would be difficult. So would be convincing the civilian population that these outsiders came in their interest.

What would be the likelihood of success? For instance, Venezuela formally has 123,000 men under arms, 63,000 in the army. The military leadership is unlikely to defect, since it benefits alongside Maduro and his cronies from plundering the population. For instance, Venezuela’s Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino Lopez “is understood to benefit from a web of companies and properties both in and outside Venezuela.” The conscript force’s desertion rate, however, is high. Indeed, officers who have fled Venezuela speak of “massive desertions” and observers call its military a “paper tiger.” Moreover, the army has demonstrated little aptitude when deployed, being badly defeated by a small force of former FARC guerrillas in Colombia. So mercenary advocates assume that even a modest expeditionary force, presumably supplemented by dissatisfied citizens, could defeat regime forces. 

Yet the imponderables are many. Would the opposition unite behind such a movement? What if there were hostile, competing mercenary forces? Historically Chavez/Maduro opponents have been badly divided. Although they largely supported Maria Corina Machado, who was barred from running for president, she advocated nonviolent protest in response. Would she back a violent insurrection? Would those who created their own army accept someone else as the country’s leader? Although there is a sense that nothing could be worse than the present, experience suggests that it could always get worse. 

What if the invading force was made up mostly of foreigners? Especially foreign fighters not noted for their humanitarian impulses? As noted earlier, they might not be well received. Foreign fighters might return the favor, treating Venezuelans with brutal suspicion. Moreover, what if Cuba, Russia, or China, which all now provide essential security support for Venezuela, increased their role, perhaps even sending armed formations—such as the reorganized Wagner Group? The latter has proved that it can fight. Even North Koreans might end up on the way. Caracas and its friends could preempt any attack since they would certainly know if and where the group was being trained and be alerted when thousands of mercenaries moved.

Finally, what if the foreign force was strong enough to start a fight but not strong enough to oust Maduro & Co.? The result could be a lengthy civil war that wreaked humanitarian havoc irrespective of the ultimate outcome. What if Cuba doubled down to save the regime, while expats attempted to raise reinforcements and Washington decided that it could no longer remain aloof? The result could be an expanding struggle as the proxy conflict between Russia and the U.S. reached Latin America. What would be the impact on Latin American politics, if Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico continued to support Caracas? Even Maduro’s regional critics might feel uncomfortable at direct American intervention yet again in Latin America’s affairs. And the Venezuelan people would suffer if outsiders turned their nation into a battlefield, rather like America did to Afghanistan for two decades. U.S. policymakers safely ensconced in Washington have proved all too willing to turn other nations into charnel houses for allegedly humanitarian ends.

What to do about the evil authoritarians among us? Expats hiring an army to oust dictators seems to be an attractive option. Nevertheless, this strategy, like war by Washington, should be a last resort at best, and usually no resort even then. Much could go wrong, and, given human history, much almost certainly would go wrong. We should never underestimate Washington’s ability to make desperate situations even worse.