Leave Syria to the Syrians

In the view of many Washington policymakers, Syria is like the Hotel California: You can check out, but never leave. President-elect Donald Trump should remedy his first-term mistake and withdraw American troops from Syria. 

Bashar al-Assad, whom successive American administrations sought to oust as Syria’s president, has been swept away with little fight. The Islamic State, or ISIS, the other target of American military action, remains but a bad memory. Washington’s adversaries—especially Russia and Iran—suffered a major geopolitical defeat. There no longer is any excuse for U.S. involvement in Syria. 

The Arab Spring hit Syria in 2011 as demonstrations broke out against Assad, who responded violently, yielding a multi-sided civil war. Although Syria was never a serious American security interest, the Obama administration leaped into the fray, assuming that it could micro-manage a brutal, multi-sided civil war. 

Washington sought to oust Assad, discouraging negotiation. Yet its efforts to support moderates foundered. A half-billion-dollar Pentagon program delivered just four or five fighters in the field. The CIA spent a billion dollars with somewhat better results, but extremists ended up dominating the fight, causing U.S. officials to limit aid. According to the New York Times, “the equipment to be provided to the rebel groups would not include antitank rockets or other high-end equipment that could eventually cause serious damage if they fall into the hands of groups that commit acts of terrorism against the United States or its allies.” 

Nevertheless, reported journalist Mehdi Hasan, the U.S. government was among “those responsible for arming and backing some of Syria’s most thuggish rebel groups.” Agency-trained insurgents were little better than their adversaries, having “summarily executed prisoners and committed other violations of the rules of armed conflict.” Even the al-Qaeda affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra, or the al-Nusra Front, indirectly received U.S. aid, often captured from or gifted by other American trainees. 

Washington also intervened to destroy the ISIS “caliphate,” relying on the Kurdish-dominated coalition Syrian Democratic Forces. Turkey, a NATO ally, opposed Assad, but initially aided ISIS. Ankara later united two score insurgent factions into the Syrian National Army, which launched several brutal offensives against the Kurds and their militia, the People’s Defense Units (YPG). The SNA committed “a host of violations, including summary killings of Kurdish forces, political activists, and emergency responders, and looting and confiscation of property,” and even threatened U.S. personnel.

Although Washington decried Turkey’s intervention, half of the SNA factions “were previously supported by the United States, three of them via the Pentagon’s program to combat DAESH [ISIS]. Eighteen of these factions were supplied by the CIA … . Fourteen factions of the 28 were also recipients of the U.S.-supplied 16 TOW anti-tank guided missiles.” Even more bizarrely, Syrian groups funded by the CIA sometimes battled those funded by the Pentagon. Reported the Los Angeles Times, these insurgents “have begun to fight each other on the plains between the besieged city of Aleppo and the Turkish border, highlighting how little control U.S. intelligence officers and military planners have over the groups they have financed and trained.”

Washington’s sole success, the Islamic State’s defeat, ended any meaningful role for U.S. troops in 2017. Special envoy James Jeffrey admitted misleading the president to keep U.S. troops in Syria. Trump’s aides preyed on his desire to seize Syrian oil. Although Washington formally justified its presence as containing ISIS remnants, it occupied oilfields belonging to the Damascus government, illegally transferring petroleum to the Kurds. Today 2,000 Americans, more than twice the number long admitted by the Pentagon, are at risk for no good reason. They were fired on and obstructed by Russian and Syrian forces and threatened by Turkish proxies. They also have been frequently targeted by Iranian-backed militias in neighboring Iraq, suffering more than 125 attacks since October 2023. 

Standing alone, Assad’s overthrow is an unmitigated blessing. But what now? The dominant insurgent force is Hayʼat Tahrir al-Sham or HTS, which began as al-Nusra. It has ruthlessly governed Idlib and surrounding territory, brooking little dissent and oppressing religious minorities. Reported Mackenzie Holtz of the Center for Strategic and International Studies: “While HTS presents itself as less ideologically extreme than al Qaeda or ISIS, the brutal measures HTS uses to maintain control over its territory are a far cry from the benevolent, citizen-led government shown on its media outlets.”

The group’s rule eased some over time and HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa, better known as Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, has sought to reassure Syrians and foreign governments. In return the U.S. rewarded him by removing the $10 million bounty on his head. On occupying Kabul, however, the Afghan Taliban similarly promised moderation. After Assad’s flight, Christians have been harassed and thousands of religious minorities have fled to Lebanon. The Hudson Institute’s Nina Shea points to the many atrocities committed during the civil war: “Such brutality stemmed from the fanatical religious hatred nurtured by these same jihadi militants, whether called al Qaeda, ISIS or HTS.” Moreover, hardline Muslim factions aligned with al-Sharaa have refused to disarm and criticized him for laxness in enforcing Islam. 

Trump should declare “mission accomplished.” Assad is gone. Mohammed A. Salih of the Foreign Policy Research Institute and Shukriya Bradost of the Middle East Institute claim that a US presence preserves “US influence” in the region, but fixing Syria is neither Washington’s responsibility nor within its competence. Violent combat might erupt again: multiple factions are in play, including HTS, SNA, YPG, and the apparently revived “moderate” Free Syrian Army in the south. Syria’s future will be determined by contending domestic factions and surrounding states like Turkey, which have far more at stake than America. 

The Islamic State’s power has been broken. After Assad’s fall, the U.S. launched an aerial fusillade on ISIS targets. The group’s military revival is unlikely, and this possibility can be dealt with by others: Every Mideast government and Syrian insurgent group, including HTS, oppose the Islamic State. There certainly is no need for U.S. ground forces in Syria. 

Nor need Washington worry about Israel. Steven A. Cook of the Council of Foreign Relations noted that “the Israelis are capable of taking care of themselves in the Syrian conflict.” Israel long outpaced Syria militarily and enjoyed a modus vivendi with Damascus, which did not oppose Israeli military action in Syria. HTS appears ready to follow suit.

Iran, which poses no threat to America, has been greatly weakened by Assad’s fall and Israel’s earlier battering of Hezbollah. Russia’s modest presence in Syria—which now might disappear of its own accord—also matters little. Washington dramatically overmatched Moscow in the Middle East even during the Cold War, when Damascus became a Soviet client, and is much more dominant today. 

Which leaves the Syrian Kurds. After the Islamic State’s defeat Washington nominally maintained its garrison as a prophylactic to an ISIS resurgence, but in practice the Pentagon hoped to protect the Kurds from Turkey. Trump’s first-term order to withdraw American forces from Syria generated unusually sharp, even hysterical, criticism and was defeated by what amounted to a fifth column within his own administration.

Similar demands that America remain are advanced after Assad’s collapse. For instance, argue Salih and Bradost, “the United States must support its Kurdish and Arab SDF partners to avert an impending humanitarian and security crisis, mediate between the SDF and Turkey, and maintain leverage in shaping Syria’s future amid evolving regional geopolitics.” 

Sinan Ciddi of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies would go even further, “bolstering U.S. presence in Kurdish held territory in Rojava, and clearly communicat[ing] to all actors that the U.S. stands by its partners and will not permit harm to come to them.”

A relatively liberal and democratic community, especially when compared to its neighbors, the Kurdish population deserves special sympathy. The Kurds avoided conflict with Damascus, which lacked the military force to reassert control over the north. With Assad’s fall the Kurdish authorities are nervously confronting HTS and especially the SNA. The latter attacked around Manbij, which the YPG yielded, and Kobani, where the Kurds famously defeated an ISIS offensive a decade ago. Radio France Internationale reported: “Turkish foreign minister Hakan Fidan says Turkey is determined to prevent the YPG and its [Turkish] affiliate the PKK from exploiting a power vacuum following” Assad’s fall.

The U.S. should exit this messy denouement. First, the U.S. made no security commitment to the Kurds, which appropriately requires a treaty, negotiated by the president and, after the public has weighed in, ratified by the Senate. Second, Americans have no obligation to the Kurds. ISIS threatened them, not America; they fought for themselves, not America. The U.S. helped them more than they helped America. Third, to the extent there was a partnership, it was against ISIS, not Turkey. For good or ill (I tend to think the latter), Ankara has superior standing with the U.S. Turkey may be a dubious ally, but it remains one of more than seven decades. 

Fourth, 2,000 Americans are not going to stop the SNA. A few years ago Rep. Eliot Engel argued that Washington should consider kicking Ankara out of Syria. How? Sen. Lindsey Graham recently threatened sanctions, but that likely would backfire, intensifying Turkey’s commitment to an independent “neo-Ottoman” foreign policy. Should Washington use force to prevent Ankara from protecting what it views as an existential interest? It would be reckless to forever entangle the U.S. in the Turkish-Kurdish imbroglio, in which 30,000 to 40,000 and perhaps more people died in the initial combat rounds starting in the mid-1980s, and thousands more have perished since the resumption of hostilities a decade ago.

Hopefully the Syrian civil war has entered its endgame, instead of begun a new round of conflict. After so much death and destruction, the Syrian people deserve a stable, prosperous, and liberal peace. Unfortunately, US policymakers have repeatedly demonstrated that achieving such a result is beyond their abilities. Remember Haiti, Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. As for Syria, observed Rosemary Kelanic of Defense Priorities: “The fact that the U.S. military mission in Syria was rooted in the failures of the Iraq war should serve as a cautionary tale about the dangers of imprudent interventions.”Trump has the right idea. As the Assad regime tottered, he proclaimed that the U.S. “should have nothing to do with” Syria, which “is not our fight.” It’s time for Americans to come home and leave Syrians and their neighbors to build a better future.