Foreign Affairs For now, President Trump should seek to freeze, not end, Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program. American foreign policy is often built on illusions. One is that North Korea must not possess nuclear weapons. Of course, it developed them long ago. The only questions today are how many nukes will Pyongyang produce, and who will it target? The answers, unfortunately, almost certainly are “a lot” and “America.” About this threat President Joe Biden did nothing. Out of office little more than a month, Biden is already largely forgotten. He bungled policy around the world, including toward the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. He offered to talk to Pyongyang, but not about anything of interest to the DPRK’s Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un. Washington insisted on denuclearization, which Kim long ago rejected. Instead, he expanded the North’s arsenal and developed longer range missiles. Kim said Pyongyang’s nuclear status was “irreversible” and insisted that “there can be no bargaining over our nuclear weapons.” He later explained: “the U.S. and its vassal forces have still perpetrated vicious anti-DPRK confrontational moves, and the desperate efforts of the enemies have reached the extremes unprecedented in history in their reckless, provocative and dangerous nature.” In January Pyongyang told a United Nations disarmament conference: “As a responsible nuclear weapons state, we will continue to make efforts to prevent all forms of war and to protect peace and stability.” Last month the regime insisted that its nuclear force is not “a bargaining chip that can be exchanged for a mere sum of money.” With Biden gone, America’s foreign policy elite—known as “the Blob”—fears that Trump will seek to revive his personal diplomacy with Kim. So do the South Koreans. Seoul’s National Intelligence Service nervously predicted that Trump might unilaterally pursue an arms deal. If this proves to be the case, argued opposition legislator Park Sun-won, “The government needs to prevent any deals on North Korean nuclear weapons that exclude South Korea from happening.” In mid-January, incoming Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth set off even more alarm bells when he called the DPRK a “nuclear state” and referred to its “status as a nuclear power.” Moreover, Trump observed that Kim “is a nuclear state,” apparently meaning the North Korean nation. The result was wailing and gnashing of teeth in both Washington and Seoul. The statements by Hegseth and Trump were true, but critics apparently feared that accurate terminology communicated acceptance of the North’s status. A few decades ago, preventing a North Korean nuke was a reasonable objective. The DPRK was desperately poor and far from joining the nuclear club. Neither of its long-time patrons, the People’s Republic of China and Soviet Union, wanted Pyongyang to possess nuclear weapons. When the Cold War ended and the USSR collapsed, the North was left uniquely vulnerable to U.S. pressure, and therefore perhaps open to a deal. Policymakers hoped that Great Leader Kim Il-sung could be convinced to join the emerging global marketplace. However, that time is long past, and that world long gone. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, previously a hawk when it came to North Korea, admits that Kim Jong-un is not likely to surrender what he views as “his insurance policy to stay in power.” Nonproliferation always has been based on ostentatious shared hypocrisy. The major nuclear powers—the U.S, USSR, PRC, United Kingdom, and France—proclaimed that they had tasted sin, and therefore were determined to preserve their comfortable atomic oligopoly. Of course, the big five remained free to expand and improve their arsenals. Over the years three other states, Israel, India, and Pakistan, crashed the nuclear circle and were ultimately accommodated by the major powers. South Africa made a brief appearance with a minimal arsenal but abandoned its program with the end of the apartheid regime. Finally, North Korea broke through but faces resistance still. Its ultimate ambitions are unknown. However, a 2021 study by the Rand Corporation warned that within a few years “North Korea could have 200 nuclear weapons and several dozen intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and hundreds of theater missiles for delivering the nuclear weapons. The ROK and the United States are not prepared, and do not plan to be prepared, to deal with the coercive and warfighting leverage that these weapons would give North Korea.” Expanding missile ranges to reach the U.S. would prove particularly dangerous for Americans. A second Korean War would be horrendous, and U.S. liability won’t long remain limited to the Korean peninsula. Soon Pyongyang will possess the capability to destroy the American homeland. That is a price far too high to pay to protect the Republic of Korea, which, like Europe, is capable of defending itself. Kim may be within reach of creating such a deterrent to America, especially if Moscow offers some technical assistance in return for the DPRK’s support in Ukraine. Thus, he has little incentive to sacrifice a capability so dearly bought and so nearly decisive. Possessing a few score, and perhaps hundred, nuclear weapons, globe-spanning missiles, and wide variety of delivery vehicles would turn the otherwise decrepit and marginal state into a Weltmacht, firmly lodged within the second rank of nuclear powers. What can the U.S. threaten or offer to achieve denuclearization? Not much. Pyongyang has survived years of sanctions. Despite a difficult relationship with the North, the PRC almost certainly will continue to emphasize stability over denuclearization on the peninsula. And today Moscow also guarantees the DPRK’s survival. Even a revival of U.S.-Russian relations is unlikely to cause the Putin government to turn on North Korea, which has proved a useful ally. There also are carrots. In 2018 Trump spoke of the “brilliant potential” for a modernized DPRK, playing up the prospects for economic development. For a time this possibility seemed to attract Kim, who promised his own people a better life. However, after the collapse in bilateral negotiations at the February 2019 Hanoi summit, Kim reversed course, dropping economic reforms, emphasizing military development, and further isolating his nation. This should surprise no one. It has become evident to all that the U.S. cannot be trusted to keep its agreements. Moscow went to war against Ukraine after the allies violated multiple assurances not to expand NATO to Russia’s border. Ukraine and Libya were attacked after abandoning an inherited nuclear arsenal and a nascent nuclear program, respectively, in response to U.S. commitments. Indeed, Libya’s Muammar Gadaffi was ousted and killed after relying on President George W. Bush’s promises of goodwill. For any opponent of Washington, regime change could be only a short military campaign away. However, the North Korean leader, when he met Trump seven years ago, offered to close the Yongbyon nuclear facility in return for sanctions relief. His suspension of missile testing demonstrated that he would fulfill his commitments. This suggests the potential for further negotiation. Marco Rubio, at his confirmation hearing to become secretary of state, testified: “I think there has to be an appetite for a very serious, broader North Korea policy,” Thus, Trump’s objective should be to cap and limit the DPRK’s nuclear stockpile. This was the sort of arms control which the U.S. and Russia engaged in during the Cold War. Freezing the North Korean program alone would be a major victory. And Washington wouldn’t have to stop there. It could build on success and continue to push for full denuclearization, however unlikely that might be. Such a negotiation could be stillborn, of course, but would have a better chance of success than doing nothing. Criticisms of this approach are many. One is that the North would cheat on any promised freeze. That argument proves too much. Pyongyang would be even more likely to cheat on full-blown denuclearization. If verification is impossible, why insist that Kim do what the U.S. will never be able to confirm and enforce? Another claim is that acknowledging Pyongyang’s possession of nuclear weapons would undermine the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Actually, what threatens the NPT is the North Korean nuclear program, especially if it continues to advance in number and sophistication. The best way to limit the damage would be to restrain the North’s efforts. If the international nuclear regime could survive Washington’s acceptance of other nations as nuclear states, it could survive its acceptance of the North as well. Some critics contend that South Korea and Japan would be disturbed by any American retreat from denuclearization. For instance, the ROK foreign ministry responded to Hegseth’s testimony: “Under the NPT (Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty), North Korea can never be recognized as a nuclear-armed state.” The Korea Times worried that doing so would leave “South Korea and its allies to confront the reality of a nuclear-armed North Korea.” However, they face that today. What threatens the two is an increasingly powerful nuclear North, not Washington’s recognition of that reality. In any case, the starting point to eliminate Pyongyang’s nukes is limiting their number. Failing that, there is no chance of denuclearization. The Korea Times also feared that “This potential shift … could trigger a dangerous regional domino effect. If North Korea is recognized as a nuclear power, countries like South Korea, Japan and even Taiwan may reconsider their non-nuclear stances.” Again, the challenge is the existence of the DPRK program, not recognition of the program’s existence. Support for a South Korean program is strong because the North is a nuclear state, not because the U.S. recognizes it as such. (Moreover, there would be no better deterrent to Chinese aggressiveness than America’s democratic allies going nuclear.) More credibly, America’s allies might fear a U.S.-North Korean agreement that focused on limiting the DPRK’s ability to hit America, which Victor Cha of CSIS calls “really anathema when you look at it from a South Korean perspective.” That, however, is a consequence of them choosing to rely on the U.S. government. Every American president has an obligation to put his own people’s interests before those of other nations. Having seen Trump’s treatment of Washington’s European allies, Seoul and Tokyo should prepare to do a lot more to defend themselves. Subscribe Today Get daily emails in your inbox The only serious objection is that agreeing to arms control might preclude denuclearization. However, that seems unlikely. Kim is much more likely to freeze his program than end it. The administration could conceivably overpay for a freeze, reducing the incentives available to achieve denuclearization, but competent negotiation is necessary irrespective of the ultimate objective. The perfect desire of denuclearization should not be allowed to become the enemy of the achievable good of nuclear limitation. Hegseth is correct that North Korea is a nuclear state. Nevertheless, said National Security Council spokesman Brian Hughes, “President Trump will pursue the complete denuclearization of North Korea, just as he did in his first term.” However, that doesn’t preclude Trump from focusing on lesser but more achievable objectives first. Indeed, his personal diplomatic style makes that course likely. Although the president is currently focused on Ukraine, he should address North Korea soon. Kim is seeking to create a credible nuclear deterrent capable of ravaging the U.S. homeland. Thwarting that threat requires expeditious action and serious negotiation. This president, at least, realizes that he is responsible to the American people, not other governments, no matter how friendly. Read More
