What If There Were Russian Missiles in Canada?

Imagine it is October 2025. A ceasefire has been achieved between Russia and Ukraine. Moscow’s attention shifted to North America. Canada’s left-wing prime minister leaned toward making a trade deal with Russia and its Central Asian partners. Washington, however, offered a last-minute financial sweetener, an early Christmas present of sorts, and Ottawa turned back to the U.S.

Angry crowds hit the streets, causing chaos in Canada’s capital. Moscow promotes the violence, as its propagandists lauded democracy in action. When the police give way, Canada’s premier flees south. Russian operatives begin putting their candidates for office forward, and new elections confirm a sharp shift toward Russia, which invites Ottawa to join the Collective Security Treaty Organization. The U.S. responds by invading Canada. The Canucks prove surprisingly resilient against personnel used to fighting distant irregulars, and Moscow floods Canada with weapons, including missiles, for use against America. The first salvo results in strikes on cities across America, including on the U.S. Capitol in Washington, DC.

Predict Washington’s reaction. 1) Officials admit that Moscow had every right to send arms for Canada’s defense, noting that “it’s something that we did for Ukraine”; 2) policymakers agree that the costs of the continuing war were too great and decided to make a humiliating withdrawal; 3) the president warns that unless Russia stood down “immediately,” there would be serious and deadly consequences. 

Before answering, remember the Cuban Missile Crisis. Of course, there would be major differences from October 1962. Yet the disparity of interests between the parties and the willingness of the threatened party to take greater risks are similar. Moreover, though Moscow is weaker conventionally, nuclear weapons are the ultimate equalizer. Indeed, the mere threat of Russian nuclear strikes might drive allied states out of the fray.

Nevertheless, Ukraine, allied states, and many American politicians continue to press the Biden administration to allow Kiev to use anything for any purpose against Russia. And American officials piously dismiss Vladimir Putin’s claim that approving use of U.S. missiles for use against Russia would place the two nations at war. Nevertheless, cooler heads may yet prevail. Only a couple weeks ago commentators were certain that Washington would join London in approving removal of restrictions on Ukraine’s use of Western missiles. However, no announcement was forthcoming. The administration’s refusal to toss caution to the wind has generated a tsunami of caterwauling, especially by European governments (even though the Pentagon does not believe lifting restrictions would turn the military tide in Kiev’s favor). An increasing number of allied policymakers appear ready to adopt Mad Magazine’s famous slogan, “What, me worry?”

Americans should worry. Already the U.S. and other NATO governments have deployed ground forces, many as de facto combatants, in Ukraine. The argument for coming as close as possible to participating in a war without directly shooting at the other side—allied troops are already in Ukraine operating donated weapons—is deceptively simple. Putin is a wimpy blowhard who knows that Moscow would lose any confrontation with the West. Hence, the allies can do whatever they want and Russia will be forced to accept the consequences. So why not bombard his cities and humiliate his people? What could possibly go wrong?

A lot. It’s worth remembering that efforts to psychoanalyze Putin have failed miserably. President George W. Bush looked into the Russian president’s eyes, saw his soul, and decided that it was good. President Barack Obama was convinced that he could argue Putin out of his policies, such as hostility toward Kiev’s Poroshenko government and support for the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Donald Trump believed he could make a deal with Putin even after after his administration enhanced economic sanctions against Moscow and provided lethal aid to Ukraine. In February 2022 almost the entire panoply of policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic, including Russia specialists, dismissed the likelihood that Putin would launch a general invasion of Ukraine. 

So, a little skepticism about the latest predictions from Washington and allied solons is warranted. Unfortunately, it is difficult to determine ahead of time which redlines for anyone are real. We usually find out only after the other side has decided to enforce a supposed red line.

In any case, there is an obvious reason why Putin has not yet acted. He is not squeamish about brutally suppressing his opponents. Moreover, it is foolish to underestimate the Russian military, despite its blundering setbacks in Ukraine. The force remains potent and has adapted well to the changing combat. Moscow possesses a nuclear arsenal comparable to America’s in size and better prepared for tactical use.

Nevertheless, Putin remains a generally pragmatic, rational actor, despite a likely lack of honest feedback about his policies. So far he has sought to limit U.S. and European support for Ukraine with threats, but probably has failed to act on them because until now the risks have seemed greater than the rewards. Yet his assessment might change.

Most importantly, he evidently believes that Russia is winning. Although Ukraine remains able to strike creatively and surprisingly, as in its incursion in Kursk and destruction of major Russian arms depots, the bilateral resource differential, especially in manpower, is daunting. Both Ukrainians and Russians are bleeding, but the former risk running out of human cannon-fodder sooner. Kiev looks a bit like the Confederacy in the Civil War and Germany in the Second World War, able to bloody their opponents but unable to change the outcome. So far there are no Wunderwaffe capable of forcing victory. At this time Putin would be foolish to expand the fight. Then Moscow likely would lose a conventional battle, while use of nuclear weapons could easily escalate into a country-ending cataclysm. Hence, Putin is demonstrating prudence, not cowardice.

But the war could evolve unpredictably. Even irregular missile strikes on Moscow and other high-profile targets might increase domestic pressure on him to respond. Already the strongest internal criticism of his war policy comes from hawks, not doves. If Moscow elites begin to feel insecure, they could demand immediate and tougher retaliation.

Moreover, even if Russia is objectively winning, internal pressures could threaten not only his rule, but also the autocratic regime and Russian state. He might have to speed the military advance and spite the Western allies to survive, though doing so risked a dangerous extension of the war. The Zelensky government might cheer this result, rather like British Prime Minister Winston Churchill expressed his pleasure mixed with horror at hearing the news of Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor. But this course certainly would not be in the interest of America, which would bear the brunt of any war with Russia.

Moscow also could respond asymmetrically. One option would be to ramp up sabotage and other operations in Europe, expanding the target set to energy facilities, electrical infrastructure, and other civilian targets—which, if discovered, would not provoke war. Russia also might strike limited military targets of hawkish NATO states, such as the United Kingdom. Moreover, Russia already is opposing the U.S. on multiple fronts around the world. At modest cost Putin’s government could act on its threats and increase military aid and weapons sales to Niger and other African governments turned hostile to Washington, as well as Iran, Syria, Yemen’s Houthis, and North Korea. Not unreasonably, asked Putin: “If someone thinks it is possible to supply such weapons to a war zone in order to strike at our territory, then why do we not have the right to supply our weapons of the same class to those regions of the world where there will be strikes on sensitive facilities of those countries that are doing this to Russia?”

So far Moscow appears to have been cautious about upsetting other nations with which it has cultivated relations, including Saudi Arabia, Israel, and South Korea. However, Putin could decide that forbearance encourages continued U.S. escalation. He also could focus on America by, for instance, aiding North Korean construction of ICBMs capable of targeting the U.S. (The Republic of Korea already is within Pyongyang’s gun sights.) Such technical assistance would be difficult to discover and counteract. Worse, Moscow could aid North Korea’s existing and Iran’s presumed nuclear ambitions. Until now Russia has opposed proliferation. However, if the Putin government perceives the U.S. and NATO as waging war on Russia, that could change.

The U.S. and Soviet Union fought several proxy wars, but always preserved a degree of distance and deniability. Today Americans and Europeans openly plan to spread fire and brimstone throughout Russia. Flip the situation around: Who believes that U.S. policymakers would submissively accept Russia sending missiles to Canada for use against America? Why assume that Russia would be more welcoming?

Ultimately, U.S. policymakers must decide whom they represent. There is good reason to sympathize with Ukraine. Russia’s invasion was wrong and has resulted in mass casualties and destruction. The allies share responsibility for the conflict, but that does not exonerate Putin. Nevertheless, Ukraine is not in NATO because none of the allies, at least those which would do the serious fighting in any war with Russia, believed it was important enough for their security to defend. That hasn’t changed since 2022. 

Putin is a malign actor, but hysterical claims that he is the reincarnation of Adolf Hitler or Joseph Stalin preparing a blitzkrieg to the Atlantic is silly. The Russian president went to war in Ukraine because he didn’t want a NATO country on his border which could leave him in conflict with Europe and the U.S. Why would he then attack other NATO members putting him at war with the rest of Europe and the U.S? Anyway, he lacks the wherewithal to conquer his neighbors, at least with reasonable hope of success and at reasonable cost, as Moscow’s extended battle with Ukraine demonstrates.

The U.S. should avoid an unnecessary confrontation with Russia, a nuclear-armed major power, over interests that the latter believes to be vital. Putin has proved that he believes Ukraine is worth fighting over, while the U.S. did not before and does not now. As the weaker conventional power, Russia must rely more heavily on nuclear weapons to maintain an international balance. With Washington prepared to approach the military brink, Moscow cannot afford to back down, which would leave it a second-rate power. After muddling through the Cold War and avoiding nuclear conflict during the Cuban Missile Crisis and Able Archer Exercise contretemps, the U.S. should not risk it all over an issue never seen as important, let alone vital.

The slogan “America First” acquired an ugly reputation from the 1930s. However, the underlying sentiment should be the animating philosophy for U.S. foreign policy, and especially decisions as to war and peace. Washington’s primary duty is to those whom it represents and who it expects to fight on its behalf. It has a moral responsibility to others, often violated. However, U.S. policymakers have no warrant to risk America’s future by promiscuously making other nations’ conflicts its own.

What should NATO, and especially the U.S., do in Ukraine? This is no video game which can be reset at will. If Americans would not accept another nation supplying missiles to bombard the U.S. homeland, they should not expect Russians to do the same. President Joe Biden will leave a far more dangerous world than when he arrived. It is essential that he not prime Ukraine for a nuclear explosion on his way out.