What’s Next for Trump On Israel?

President Donald Trump’s Middle East policy’s staunch pro-Israeli tilt in his first term earned him the reputation of being the most pro-Israel American president ever. There are signs this may not necessarily be the case of Trump 2.0, notwithstanding the track records of some of his appointees. Chief among these signs are the strong indicators that the “former-new” president will opt for a less escalatory approach toward Tehran. Given the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s obsession with Iran, this may cause a serious rift in bilateral ties.  

During his inauguration speech Trump emphasized his ambitions to go down in history as a peacemaker, and that success will be defined by not getting involved in wars. Such statements carry special significance in relation to the Middle East, the main battlefield for the U.S. military since the 9/11 attacks. More importantly Trump’s remarks would appear to rebuff the calls for threatening Iran with military action over its nuclear program. In a recent article for the Washington Post, Dennis Ross—whose pro-Israeli credentials are no secret—issued such a call, essentially arguing that placing the military option on the table would make it more likely that Tehran would accept a deal.  

While one may argue that Trump’s declarations do not suffice to qualify as rejecting these policy prescriptions, senior Trump officials have adopted a similar tone, going so far as stating that American and Israeli interests do not converge when it comes to dealing with Iran. 

“Sometimes we’re going to have overlapping interests, and sometimes we’re going to have distinct interests [from Israel’s],” explained Vice President J.D.  Vance in an interview with “The Tom Dillon Show” last October. 

“And our interest very much is in not going to war with Iran,” he added. 

Even more hawkish officials in Trump 2.0 have hinted at the possibility of reaching a deal with Iran. 

“My view of [Iran] is that we should be open to any arrangement that allows us to have safety and stability in the region, but one in which we’re clear-eyed,” Secretary of State Marco Rubio told lawmakers during his confirmation hearing.

Trump’s recent appointments and firings point in a similar direction. One example is the nomination of Elbridge Colby for undersecretary of defense for policy. Known for his China-centric approach, Colby has argued against military action targeting Iran and described the broader Middle East as a secondary theater for U.S. interests. Meanwhile the former CIA analyst Michael DiMino has been tapped as the Pentagon’s point man for the Middle East. His selection has particularly sparked concerns in pro-Israel circles over his opposition to military action against Iran and to U.S. support for Israel against Hezbollah. DiMino has also opposed military action against the Yemeni Ansar Allah or Houthi movement, arguing instead that the best way to halt the latter’s attacks in the Red Sea was to pressure Israel into agreeing to a ceasefire in Gaza. (The Houthis have indeed declared they will limit their operations following the Gaza ceasefire agreement.)

At the same time Trump fired his former Iran envoy Brian Hook, who was a strong advocate of the “maximum pressure” campaign against Tehran. This move suggests that economic escalation may not even be in the cards .

Recent commentary by prominent pro-Israeli voices appears to confirm that all hope is lost that Trump will conduct military operations against Iran.

In a Wall Street Journal op-ed, Mark Dubowitz and Reuel Marc Gerecht of the “Foundation for Defense of Democracies” (which acts as a mouthpiece for the Netenyahu government), cite the strong opposition to war with Iran within the MAGA movement. 

Dubowitz and Gerecht however appear to resort to a plan B, calling on Trump to support Israeli military action against Iran if “hard-line diplomacy” with Tehran fails. However, the writers argue that the U.S. should intervene militarily against the Islamic Republic should the latter retaliate to an Israeli attack (assuming such an attack failed in crippling the Iranian leadership). 

In any case an Israeli attack on Iran—or any kind of attack on the Islamic Republic—would dramatically raise regional tensions and probably lead Tehran to become a nuclear-armed state, undermining American interests and increasing the likelihood that American troops would once again be fighting a war in the Middle East. 

Because of these risks, Trump may yet oppose an Israeli offensive against Iran. By doing so he would avoid the fate that befell his three predecessors who had their foreign policy upended by the Middle East. George W. Bush’s legacy was tarnished by an unnecessary war on Iraq following the 9/11 attacks. Barack Obama, despite his determination, never fully succeeded in implementing his policy of retrenchment from the Middle East and pivoting to Asia, having been forced to send troops back to the region following the rise of ISIS. 

Biden tried to follow Obama’s Asia-first foreign policy, withdrawing troops from Afghanistan and signing the AUKUS nuclear submarine deal with Britain and Australia, which aims to counter China. The Hamas-led “Operation Al-Aqsa Storm” and Israel’s reaction to that operation upended Biden’s foreign policy. The former administration found itself sending forces to the region and conducting military strikes against Yemen in order to help Israel. 

This ended up costing the Democrats the White House. Recent polls revealed that U.S. support for Israel in its war on Gaza led to Kamala Harris’ loss in the presidential race against Trump.  

Given Trump’s drive to prove himself more competent than his predecessors, he will likely go to great lengths to prevent his foreign policy agenda from being derailed by an Israeli attack on Iran which would carry a real risk of drawing the U.S. once again into conflict in the Middle East.

Indeed, it seems the American president is determined to prevent the Middle East from disrupting more pressing foreign policy priorities like competition with China (which includes Greenland and the Panama Canal), and Mexican drug cartels. 

Last October, reports revealed that Trump delivered a clear message to Netanyahu that he wanted the war on Gaza to end before he took office, if he won the election. Trump even dispatched his Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff to coerce Netanyahu into accepting a ceasefire in Gaza prior to the inauguration.

Trump also told visiting senior Israeli officials last October he wanted a ceasefire on the Israeli-Lebanese front and expressed support for the Biden administration’s efforts in this regard. 

Showing daylight between the United States and Israel on how best to approach Iran is therefore both good politics and good policy. This is especially the case when the risk of war is involved, given the American people’s lack of appetite for new military conflicts. And, as often highlighted, placing less emphasis on the Middle East and, above all, avoiding conflict in that region would also free up more resources to better compete with China.

 It would also place Washington in a better position to compete with Beijing in the Global South, which includes major middle powers like Brazil, Indonesia and South Africa, all of whom identify with the Palestinian sufferings and have not hesitated to call out Israel over its behaviour following the events of October 7, 2023. Winning over this category of countries, especially the above-mentioned middle powers, will be key in determining who emerges the victor in today’s great power competition.